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On Divisions, Diversity, and Disparity: Federal States and the Societies They Govern
Kristin M. Bakke. PhD Candidate, Political Science, University of Washington.

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Why have relations between the central government and ethnic or regional groups been mired in violence in some states but not in others? My dissertation tackles this key question, explaining federal states’ diverse capacity to contain intrastate conflicts, particularly conflicts between central governments and subnational groups in pursuit of greater autonomy or independence. Increasingly, both scholars and policymakers have turned to federalism or some form of decentralized governance as a promising means for managing such separatist struggles. Yet, while some scholars argue that federalism reduces the chances of intrastate struggles, others have suggested that it does just the opposite. Moreover, the empirical record of conflict in existing federal states demonstrates that while some federations have been free from internal conflicts, others have gone through prolonged periods of significant violence, while yet others have experienced episodic uprisings. To explain this theoretical conflict and empirical diversity, it is critical to ask not only whether, but also under which conditions, federalism can help preserve intrastate peace.

Acknowledging that there is no “one-size-fits-all” federal solution to conflicts in divided states, I argue that the degree to which federal institutions can help contain conflicts depends on how these institutions respond to certain characteristics of the societies they govern. Based on newly collected subnational data across 22 federal states from 1978 to 2000, I demonstrate that the “peace-preserving” effects of specific federal traits, such as fiscal decentralization and political party ties between tiers of government, are conditional on regional levels of wealth and ethnic composition. In order to capture the causal processes of the argument, the study includes in-depth case studies of separatist mobilization in three federations: Chechnya in Russia, Punjab in India, and Québec in Canada. The data for the case studies were collected through secondary sources and meetings and interviews with federal and regional policy-makers in the three countries. While the statistical analysis establishes that institutions cannot be seen as isolated from the societies they are meant to govern, the case studies allow me to explore how societal traits and regional politics affect the workings of institutions governing relations between central and regional governments.

The key policy implication of this research is that successful institutional design requires in-depth knowledge of the societies the institutions are meant to govern.

Government Institutions
Power-Sharing or Partition? History’s Lessons for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia
Alan J. Kuperman. Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas.

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The ambiguity of the Dayton accords may have been essential to ending Bosnia’s war, but that uncertainty has now become a liability. Final status must be addressed, and it is a decision that could have great consequence for the welfare and security of Bosnia and the wider Balkans. The optimal answer rests in part on the particularities of the region, such as its recent history of warfare, the unresolved status of Kosovo, a still fragile peace in Macedonia, and nascent secessionist movements in parts of Serbia including Vojvodina, the Presevo Valley, and the Sandzak (shared with Montenegro). But insight also can be gained by looking at the worldwide track record of attempts to share power following ethnic civil war since World War II. Such an analysis reveals how rarely and under what special conditions these efforts have succeeded, which suggests that current international efforts in Bosnia are flawed and should be adjusted.

Full text available in: Michael Innes, ed., Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2006).

Government Institutions
Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Institutions Promote Trust and Cooperation after Violent Conflict?
Sam Whitt. Assistant Professor, University of Tenessee.

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My dissertation work consisted of a survey of 681 subjects from sixteen locations across Bosnia in 2003-2004 using a stratified random sampling method. In addition to the survey, subjects participated in five experiments adapted from laboratory experiments in behavioral economics (mainly variations on the "dictator game"). The survey focuses on institutional and social trust. The experiments focus on norms of fairness in post-war Bosnian society. The findings from the survey and experiments indicate that cooperative social norms are re-emerging in the post-war period. While ethnicity still has a tangible impact on trust and cooperation, outgroups are not automatically distrusted nor ingroups universally trusted. Institutional trust seems to be a strong predictor of social trust in general and inter-ethnic trust in particular, especially at the local level. Norms of fairness across ethnicity also appear surprisingly strong in the experimental data. Most subjects do not treat outgroups remarkably different from their own coethnics in the experiments. They also have remarkably high expectations of reciprocity from non-coethnics.

Policy recommendations? Most scholars reject explanations of the Bosnian conflict based on enduring hatreds and point to institutional and entrepreneurial explanations instead. This research suggests an emerging social basis for cooperation in postwar Bosnia. It also suggests that some key institutional actors are playing a positive role in the process of reconciliation.

Government Institutions